Islamic Reform Movement in Indonesia and Beyond: Progress and Regress by Assyaukanie, L. (Luthfi)
  129 129 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM Volume 2, Number 01, June 2008 
Islamic Reform Movement in Indonesia 
ISLAMIC REFORM MOVEMENT  
IN INDONESIA AND BEYOND  
Progress and Regress 
Luthfi Assyaukanie 
Paramadina University, Jakarta, Indonesia 
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to review the Islamic 
reform agendas that have been set by Muslims reformists 
since the last century. Islamic reform movement has 
developed and spread from the Middle East to many 
Muslim countries in the world. Indonesia where Muslims 
represent the largest population enthusiastically welcomes 
such a movement. From Minangkabau in West Sumatra, 
Islamic reform movement then spreads into other areas in 
the country. It deals with issues that baffled modern 
Muslims, such as democracy, freedom, pluralism, and 
secularism. There are some progress and regress in how 
Muslims respond to those issues. In this article, I address 
four issues Muslim reformists discussed throughout the 
decades, namely: Islamic polity, women’s rights, religious 
freedom, and freedom of expression.  
Keywords: Islamic reform, Islamic modernism, Islamic 
liberalism. 
Introduction 
Islamic reform movement is an intellectual activity that brings a 
new understanding of the classical Islamic doctrines in line with the 
spirit of the age. As a scholarly activity, Islamic reform has been 
undertaken since a long time. However, as a social movement, it has 
just begun two centuries ago. Scholars such as Albert Hourani and 
Bernard Lewis consider the Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion to Egypt 
in 1798 as the beginning of the Islamic reform movement in the 
  JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM Volume 02, Number 01, June 2008 130 
Luthfi Assyaukanie 
modern times.1 Lewis regards it as a watershed and “the first shock to 
Islamic complacency, the first impulse to westernization and reform.”2 
The Bonaparte’s invasion to Egypt was important both for Muslims as 
well as for the Western people. For Muslims, it has resuscitated them 
that the modern military of the Europeans could easily defeat the 
heartland of Islam. For the Europeans, the invasion has opened their 
eyes that Islam is no longer a powerful civilization as it was in the past. 
Bonaparte’s invasion has marked a great impact for the future of 
Egyptian people. The inroad was not only a military accomplishment, 
but, as al-Jabarti >, the greatest Egyptian historian in the early modern 
times, noted, it has drawn a deep impact for the social, cultural, 
political, and scientific aspects of Muslim life.3 Apart from military 
forces, Bonaparte brought with him a team of scientists, printing 
machine, medical tools, and a set of modern laws. Although he ruled 
Egypt for only three years, he has paved the way for a long way of 
modernization of the country.4 France’s short occupation has inspired 
the rulers of modern Egypt to catch up with modern world, where 
Europe became its role model. The first Egyptian ruler, Muh }ammad 
`Ali >, sent a delegacy of students to France. It was the biggest mission 
that a Muslim ruler ever did. The mission itself, led by Rifa>’a al-
T{ah}t}a>wi> (d. 1873), was a significant mark for the history of Islamic 
reform movement in the modern times. 
From Egypt, the Islamic reform movement spread to other Islamic 
countries. Al-T{ah}t}a>wi>  inherited many disciples and followers, among 
them was Muh}ammad `Abduh (d. 1905), the greatest Muslim reformist 
in the modern times. Muslims from the Southeast Asia were among 
those influenced by the Egyptian reform movement.5 In the dawn of 
the twentieth century, Muhammad Taher Djalaluddin (d. 1956), an 
                                                 
1 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983); Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). 
2 Lewis, The Middle East and the West, p. 34. 
3 `Abd al-Rah }ma >n al-Jabarti>, ‘Aja >ib al-A <tha>r fi al-Tara >jim wa al-Akhba >r, 1st ed. (Cairo: 
Lajnat al-Baya>n al-‘Arabi>, 1958). 
4 P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 
5 Hamka, Ajahku, Riwajat Hidup Dr. H. Abd. Karim Amrullah dan Perdjuangan Kaum 
Agama di Sumatra,  2nd ed. (Djakarta: Widjaya, 1958). 
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Indonesian student in Cairo, set his foot in Singapore. He studied with 
`Abduh and established a good relationship with Rashi>d Rid }a> (d. 
1935). He learnt from these two towering figures how to write Islamic 
issues in a journalistic style. Later in 1906, he published a periodical 
called al-Imam, the first Islamic magazine in the Malay world that 
resonated `Abduh’s reformist ideas. Djalaluddin and other Middle-
Eastern graduates such as Abdullah Ahmad (d. 1933) Muhammad 
Djamil Djambek (d. 1947), and Hadji Rasul (d. 1945), were later 
recorded as the early proponents of Islamic reform movement in 
Indonesia and the Malay world.6 
Since its inception, Islamic reform movement has a liberal 
character in the sense that renaissance (nahd}ah) and the idea of progress 
became its main theme. The early Muslim reformists asked this kind of 
questions: what are the requirements of renaissance (ma> hiya shuru>t } al-
nahd}ah?); how do Muslims lag behind and how does the West progress 
(li ma>dha > ta’akhkhar al-Muslimu >n, wa li ma>dha> taqaddam ghayruhum?). 
Answers to these questions created a new discourse of Islamic 
thought, which is subsequently labeled in various terms such as 
“Islamic modernism,” “Islamic reform,” “progressive Islam,” and 
“Islamic liberalism.” 
This paper is an attempt to review the Islamic reform ideas that 
have been discussed by the Muslims reformist throughout the ages and 
how do Muslims respond to those ideas. I will focus on the reform 
agendas that the Muslim reformists have been successful and the one 
that they have failed. Islamic reform is a global phenomenon that it is 
impossible to cover all of its areas. I will therefore focus only on the 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East by providing cases from Indonesia 
and Egypt as an example. 
Reformist Agendas 
Islamic reform movement has a multitude agenda, which is very 
much dependant on its social and political context. In the nineteenth 
century, when Muslims felt so much in backward, the main discourse 
developed was the idea and the model of progress. Modern science 
                                                 
6 See Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942, East Asian 
Historical Monographs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); William R. Roff, 
The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Michael 
Francis Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds (New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
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and technology as well as the golden age of Islam in the classical times 
were often mentioned with esteem. Al-T{ah}t}a>wi> wrote a small treatise 
on Paris, where he described the triumphant of modern Europeans 
over science and technology. Likewise, Ami>r Sha >kib Arsla >n wrote a 
book on why Muslims lag behind and why the Western people 
progressed? One of the answers that Arsla>n addressed was the lack of 
education among Muslims. Qassim Ami>n, another Egyptian 
intellectual, pointed out a bad treatment of Muslims towards their 
woman. Ami >n believed that woman (i.e. mother) is the first school 
(madrasat al-’u >la>) for Muslim children. The quality of future generation 
is very much determined by the first school that they experienced (I 
will elaborate on this issue below). 
Prior to the end of the Second World War, issues such as 
colonialism, nationalism, socialism, and capitalism were quite dominant 
among Muslim intellectuals. In the Arab world, the issue of 
nationalism was developed by Khayr al-Di>n al-Tu >ni >si>, `Abd al-Rah}ma>n 
al-Kawa>kibi >, and Ah}mad Lut}fi> Sayyid, while in the Southeast Asia, the 
issue was enthusiastically discussed by such intellectuals as 
Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim, and Soekarno. After independence, 
Muslim reformists dealt with new issues such as the basis of the state, 
constitutional law, democracy, and human rights. After the 1970s, 
other issues such as gender equality, religious freedom, civil liberty, and 
freedom of expression, occupied Muslim mind. With the rise of 
Islamic radicalism in Egypt and other Muslim countries, religious 
fundamentalism and conservatism have also become the concern of 
Muslim reformists. 
Charles Kurzman, the author of well-acclaimed book Liberal Islam, 
counted several issues discussed by the Muslim reformists throughout 
the ages and categorized them into six main agendas, namely against 
theocracy, democracy, the rights of women, the rights of non-Muslims, 
freedom of thought, and the idea of progress.7 Following Kurzman’s 
categorization, in this paper, I would like to classify problems 
discussed in the current Islamic reform movement into four main 
issues: Islamic polity, women’s rights, religious freedom, and freedom 
of expression. I will discuss each of these issues in separate sections. 
                                                 
7 Charles Kurzman, Liberal Islam: A Source Book (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998). 
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Islamic Polity 
The relationship between Islam and the state is a perennial 
question that has emerged since the second quarter of the twentieth 
century. Although the issue itself has been discussed in the classical 
discipline of Islamic jurisprudence known as fiqh al-siya>sah (political 
philosophy), the modern treatment of the problem took place just in 
the twentieth century. It all began with the crisis of the caliphate in 
Turkey in 1924. On 3 March 1924, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the 
founder of the modern Turkey, abolished the caliphate system, ending 
the long dominant system of the Ottoman Empire. Ataturk’s move 
was subsequently responded by Muslims all over the world. In 1919, a 
group of Muslims in India founded an association called the Caliphate 
Movement, a political group that called for the restoration of the 
caliphate. In Egypt and Hejaz, the crisis over the caliphate was 
responded by conducting a caliphate conference held in Cairo and 
Jeddah. This call was later responded by many Muslim leaders from 
various countries. Indonesian Muslims sent two delegations for the 
conference: one to Jeddah, led by Tjokroaminoto, the leader of Sarekat 
Islam, and the other to Cairo, led by Abdul Karim Amrullah, a well-
known Muslim reformist from Sumatra. 
Apart from the political responses, the issue of the caliphate was 
also responded intellectually. The intellectual responses had actually 
begun several years before the caliphate was formally closed by 
Ataturk. Muh}ammad Rashi>d Rid }a>, the student of `Abduh and a scholar 
of Egyptian al-Azhar, wrote a series of articles on caliphate in al-Mana >r, 
a magazine he edited. The article was later published as a book under 
the title al-Ima>mah wa al-Khila>fah al-`Uz}ma> (the Imamate and the Great 
Caliphate). The main idea that Rid }a> tried to deliver was that caliphate is 
a religious obligation that modern Muslims must maintain. Quoting the 
classical Islamic sources such as al-Ma>wa>rdi >’s al-Ah}ka>m al-Sult}a>ni >yah 
and Ibn Taymi >yah’s al-Siy >asah al-Shar`i >yah, Rid }a> argued that caliphate is 
an Islamic political system inspired by the Qur’a>n and the Prophetic 
tradition (sunnah). All Muslims are obliged to uphold the system and 
must try their best to fight against its abolition. Rid}a>’s argument was 
soon rebutted by his colleague, `Ali `Abd al-Ra >ziq, also a student of 
`Abduh and graduate of al-Azhar, in his masterpiece, al-Isla>m wa Niz }a>m 
al-H{ukm (Islam and the Government System). `Abd al-Ra>ziq argued 
that caliphate is not a political system required deliberately by Islam. 
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The Prophet Muh }ammad was sent by God as a messenger and not as a 
political leader, let alone a head of state. Islam does not prescribe 
Muslims to build certain form of government. In fact, the form of 
government is entirely designated to Muslim’s reasoning (ijtiha>d). 
The debate between Rid}a > and `Abd al-Ra>ziq reflected the Muslim 
political attitude over the issue of caliphate. Muslims were broadly 
divided into two factions: the opponents and the proponents. Most of 
secular Muslims (namely those who do not come from the religious 
background) would likely reject the idea of caliphate that they would 
go with `Abd al-Ra>ziq’s argument. Meanwhile, Muslims who come 
from the religious background, particularly those who had a strong 
affiliation with Islamic institutions, would likely support Rashi>d Rid }a>’s. 
In the Arab world, `Abd al-Ra >ziq’s view was supported by the 
nationalists such as Ami >n al-Riha>ni >, Zaki > al-Arsu >zi >, S {ala>h } al-Di>n al-
Bi>tar, and Sa>t}i' al-H{usri >.8 In Indonesia, secular leaders such as 
Soekarno and Soepomo often quoted `Abd al-Ra >ziq’s book to endorse 
their opposition to the idea of the Islamic state pioneered by the 
Islamists. It was quite uncommon to find Muslims from a religious 
background supporting `Abd al-Ra >ziq’s idea. What was common 
rather the opposite, namely, they would entirely denounce `Abd al-
Ra>ziq as un-Islamic or at least a Muslim who has deviated from the 
“true” Islam. This is why throughout the modern history of Islamic 
political discourse, `Abd al-Ra>ziq’s name has been extremely notorious 
among Islamic circles. 
It was only time that proved `Abd al-Ra >ziq’s quality that he was 
more desirable among Muslims than that of Rashi >d Rid }a>’s. Half a 
century later, none of Muslim rulers would adopt caliphate as a system 
of government. Even the most ardent candidates, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, preferred to choose “nation-state” as the platform of the state. 
Under Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Egypt was transformed from monarchy 
into democracy. Saudi Arabia, since the outset, declared herself as an 
“Islamic kingdom,” a new vocabulary in Islamic political thought. 
Rather than obsessed with the global imperia, the Saudi monarch stuck 
                                                 
8See their biography in Fahmi Jadan’s books, Usu>s al-Taqaddum ‘inda Mufakkir al-Isla >m fi 
al-‘A<lam al-‘Arabi> al-H {adi>th (`Amma >n: Da >r al-Shuru>q, 1988); idem., Al-Ma >d }i> fi> al-H {a >d }ir: 
Dira >sa>t fi> Tashakkula>t wa Masa>lik al-Tajri >bah al-Fikri>yah al-‘Arabi >yah (Beirut: al-
Mu’assasah al-`Arabi>yah li al-Dira >sa >t wa al-Nashr, 1997). 
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to the Hejaz, excluding the most part of Muslim lands. Rid }a>’s 
argument of caliphate was modified by some of his followers and 
sympathizers. Instead of promoting Islamic caliphate, they introduced 
a new political notion called “Islamic state.” Abu> al-A`la> al-Mawdu>di > 
of Pakistan and Sayyid Qut}b of Egypt were among the proponents of 
this idea. In Indonesia, the idea of Islamic state was supported by santri 
Muslims affiliated to the Masyumi Party. Islamic State, as Enayat 
rightly explains, is the only feasible alternative for the crumbled system 
of the caliphate.9 
Since the end of the Second World War, a few Muslim 
communities tried their luck to adopt Islam as a basis of state and 
government. Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran were among those rare 
countries to undertake this experience. The rest of the Muslim world 
prefers to be a democratic system, where people’s sovereignty 
determines the political system. Even for Muslim countries where 
Islam is officially recognized as the state’s religion, such as Malaysia, 
the entire system of government is close to democracy rather than to 
theocracy. Islamic state in a theocratic style, as precisely defined by al-
Mawdu >di > and Qut}b, has never been attracting many Muslims outside 
the countries mentioned above. Even in those countries, such as 
Pakistan and Iran, the theocratic style of Islamic state, has been 
severely contested.10  
Certainly, there are reasons why the idea of Islamic state does not 
attract many Muslims. First, it is theoretically not convincing. As 
Ahmed explains, intellectual Muslims in Pakistan never reached any 
consensus what did they mean by the Islamic state. There are at least 
four opinions regarding the idea, stretching from the very literal 
version to the extreme liberal ones.11 Second, none of the Islamic state 
has demonstrated a good example for a successful system of polity; 
neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran; neither Pakistan nor Sudan. Even a 
conservative Muslim would likely argue that those countries have 
                                                 
9 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 
2004), p. 104. 
10 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in 
Pakistan (London: Pinter, 1987); Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in 
Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush (New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
11 Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State, pp. 31-37. 
  JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM Volume 02, Number 01, June 2008 136 
Luthfi Assyaukanie 
mistakenly implemented the idea of Islamic state. Abu Hanifah, a 
member of Masyumi and an Indonesian exponent of Islamic state 
preferred Switzerland or Netherlands as a good model of Islamic state, 
rather than Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. For him, Switzerland is closer to 
the spirit of Islamic polity than those countries that formally adopt 
Islam as the basis of state.12  
In the present times, more and more Muslims denounced the idea 
of Islamic state. Even the radicals try to avoid using the term. In 2000, 
Forum Umat Islam, an association of the radical Islamic groups led by 
Abu Bakar Baashir, made an open statement that the idea of Islamic 
state is no longer visible for Indonesian Muslims. The Muslims in 
Indonesia, they argue, should not strive to establish an Islamic state.13 
This statement might be political, but the fact that the most radical 
figures in Indonesia denounced their old ideal means that Islamic state 
is no longer a spellbinding idea. Only obstinate Muslims would still 
maintain the idea. Among them are members of the Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI), a radical organization that strives to return the clock 
back by reviving the idea of Islamic caliphate. HTI was founded by 
students who generally have a poor understanding of Islam and Islamic 
history. They come from secular universities who had no training in 
Islamic sciences. Its leader, Ismail Yusanto, is a graduate of Geology of 
the Gajah Mada University (UGM). Many of HTI members are 
students of secular universities such as UGM, IPB (Bogor Institute of 
Agriculture), and UI (the University of Indonesia). The biggest Islamic 
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, has officially denounced HTI’s 
maneuver as endangering the Indonesian Republic (NKRI). 
Women’s Rights 
Discourse on the rights of women has been started since the late 
nineteenth century. Any historian of Islamic thought must mention 
Qassim Ami >n (d. 1908), an Egyptian intellectual and the disciple of 
`Abduh, as the precursor of Islamic feminism. Ami >n was not the first 
author discussing the problem of women in the Muslim world. Some 
Muslim feminists such as Aicha Ismat al-Taymuriyya (d. 1902) and 
Zaynab Fawwaz (d. 1914), had preceded him. What makes Ami>n 
                                                 
12 Abu Hanifah, Kedudukan Agama dalam Negara-Negara Modern dan Merdeka (Jogjakarta: 
Kementerian Agama R.I., 1948), p. 20. 
13 Kompas, 06/08/2000; Panjimas, 9-16/08/2000; Tekad, 7-13/08/2000. 
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important and was often considered as the father of Islamic feminism 
is because he was the first Muslim intellectual who systematically 
discussed the problem of Muslim women. Moreover, unlike his 
predecessor, Ami >n is a religious scholar and a graduate of al-Azhar. 
Ami >n wrote two books on Muslim woman, first on the liberation of 
women (tah }ri >r al-mar’ah) and second on the new women (al-mar’ah al-
jadi >dah). The first book arouses more vibe than the latter. But for most 
of the conservative Muslims, both of the books are just nightmare. 
In both books, Ami >n discusses the condition of Muslim women in 
Egypt whom he considered to have suffered from a bad patriarchal 
system. Ami>n does not blame Islam for this unfortunate condition but 
rather the Muslims who have mistakenly understood their religion. 
Like many other Muslim reformists, Ami>n considers Islam to be a 
perfect religion only that some of its teachings have been wrongly 
interpreted by its followers. In the first book, Ami>n examines some of 
Islamic doctrines that highly esteem woman’s status. In many of 
Qur’anic verses, Ami >n argues, women are mentioned equally side by 
side with men. True that there are some verses that seem to suggest 
woman inequality, but, he argues, that this kind of verses have to be 
seen in its social and historical contexts. He gives the verse on 
polygamy (Q.S. 4:3) as an example. This verse, if read properly, is 
actually an order to avoid polygamy, a practice that was very common 
in the pre-Islamic era. Ami >n argues that Muslims often stop in the first 
part of the verse while ignoring the rest, which clearly indicates that 
“men will not become just.” For Ami >n, polygamy is a pre-Islamic 
practice that was to be changed by Islam, and not the other way 
around.   
Polygamy is not the centre of Ami >n’s concern, indeed. It is only 
part of the problems. What becomes his main concern is women’s 
education and their involvement in public life. Ami >n argues that 
education is the heart of the problem and as far as women are 
concerned, they should be given priority. The argument is as follow: as 
woman will become mother for our future generation, she will become 
the first school (madrasat al-’u >la>) for our children. The quality of the 
future generation very much depends on the quality of the first school. 
The educated mother would likely give a better education to her 
children than that of the uneducated one. Moreover, education for 
women is important as it will make them independent. With their 
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education, Muslim women can earn their own living so that they could 
secure their independence and dignity before their husband. Education 
also could bring Muslim women to be actively engaged in public life 
either for work or other activities. Hence, Ami >n touches the crucial 
issues that involve Islamic doctrines on women such as women’s 
seclusion, women’s protector (mah}ram), the veil (h}ija>b), and code of 
decency (`awrah). In general, Ami>n’s view on these issues is liberal in 
the sense that he does not uncritically accept the classical opinions. He 
seems to be fully aware that one has to go beyond the classical 
understanding if he or she wants to really liberate Muslim women. For 
this and other reasons that Ami>n clearly singles out the Western 
system of society to be much better ―and thus deserves to be 
emulated― than that of the Eastern one (i.e. Muslim community). He 
writes: 
Look at the eastern countries; you will find woman 
enslaved to man and man to the ruler. Man is an oppressor 
in his home, oppressed as soon as he leaves it. Then look at 
the European countries; the governments are based on 
freedom and respect for personal rights, and the status of 
women has been raised to a high degree of respect and 
freedom of thought and action.14  
Ami >n’s daring views are crucial in invigorating the Islamic 
discourse on women’s rights. His Islamic approach to the issue has 
paved the way for theologians, scholars, and Muslim feminists to 
develop new arguments for empowering the status and role of Muslim 
women in the modern age. In Egypt, the Islamic discourse of women 
emerged quite widely and was articulated in various expressions; in 
book, articles, novels, cinemas, lectures, talk shows, and art works. 
Malak H {ifni > Nasi>f (1918), Hu>da> Sha`ra>wi> (d. 1947), Nabawiyya Mu>sa > 
(1951), and Saiza> Nabara >wi> (1985) represented the first generation of 
Egyptian feminists (or the second generation of the Arab feminists) 
who were strongly influenced by Ami>n’s works. In 1986, an alliance of 
several feminist groups in Egypt founded a magazine called al-Mar’ah 
al-Jadi >dah (the New Woman). The name was undoubtedly inspired by 
Ami >n’s book. Despite criticism and condemnation from the 
conservative `ulama>’, the discourse of Islamic feminism is rolling out as 
fast as the snow-ball. 
                                                 
14 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, p. 168. 
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In Indonesia, the feminist discourse is not only managed by the 
secularists, but also by Muslim figures from religious background. In 
2000, an Islamic non-government organization (NGO) called Rahima 
was founded by, among others, Husein Muhammad, a religious cleric 
(kiai) who runs an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in Cirebon, West 
Java. The organization was designed as a centre for training and 
information on women’s rights. Several months later, another NGO 
called Puan Amal Hayati was founded by Sinta Nuriya, the wife of the 
former president Abdurrahman Wahid. It focuses on advocating 
women’s rights, particularly from a new Islamic perspective. In 2003, 
Puan Amal Hayati run a daring project criticizing classical Islamic 
books ―known in Indonesia as “kitab kuning” (“yellow books”)― that 
contain discriminative views on women. Among the books is ‘Uqu>d al-
Lujayn, a widely-read textbook written by Nawawi al-Bantani. These 
two organizations have been tirelessly campaigning for women’s rights 
and promoting a new understanding of women’s status in Islam. They 
have also been advocating legal issues concerning women’s rights. 
When a bill contains potential discrimination against women was 
released by the parliament, Puan Amal Hayati, Rahima, and other 
similar organizations, came down to the roads, protesting it. Through 
brochures, leaflets, and other media, they campaign against polygamy, 
enforcement of wearing the veil, and the implementation of shari>‘ah in 
Indonesia. 
Islamic feminist movement in its various expressions has gained 
some successes. In the early twentieth century, Qassim Ami>n was 
alone. Now, there are many Muslim scholars who would go with 
Ami >n’s arguments. Education for women is no longer a taboo issue. 
More and more Muslim women are unhesitatingly engaged in public 
sphere, as politicians, managers, workers, scientists, lawyers, and heads 
of state. Certainly, there are still some Muslim conservatives who 
rejected the idea of Islamic feminism. They entirely reject the Muslim 
reformists’ agenda in reformulating Islamic doctrines on women. 
However, they only represent a small number of Muslims and are 
loosing their ground. In Indonesia, anti-Islamic feminism is conducted 
by the radical groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI, Front 
Pembela Islam), the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin (MMI, Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Most of 
them are ignorant of the history of Islamic thought so that they fail to 
follow the development of Islamic discourse on women. 
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The issue of women in Islam is certainly multidimensional. Certain 
issues developed in Islamic discourse of women’s rights are still 
unacceptable, such as the issue of female ima>m in mix prayer. However, 
the fact that there are some Muslims practicing and discussing them is 
an indication that it is not beyond question. Other issues such as 
polygamy and female head-of-state are growingly contested. In 
Indonesia, although most Muslims do not dare to say that Islam is 
against polygamy, they are certainly embarrassed to accept it as a 
normal value. A good case-in-point is the negative response of 
Indonesian Muslims towards Abdullah Gymnastiar, a religious cleric 
(kiai) and a popular televangelist, who got married for the second time 
several months ago.15 The news of his second-marriage sent a big 
shock wave among Indonesian Muslims. Many of them expressed their 
disagreement to what the kiai has done. The negative response was 
widely demonstrated by leaving Gymnastiar’s multi-billion religious 
programs and businesses. Reports said that six months after this 
scandal, Gymnastiar’s businesses dramatically decreased. His business’s 
revenue dropped more than 40% and his media fortune is threatened 
to collapse.16 Many progressive Muslims are happy finding that the 
sanity of Indonesian Muslims is considerably working. 
Religious Freedom 
Religious Freedom is relatively a new issue. Early Muslim 
reformists rarely discussed it, most probably because there were 
occupied by more important issues, such as colonialism, nationalism, 
and Muslim backwardness. Besides, before the end of the Second 
World War, most of Muslim countries were still under colonial 
dominion, where issues of religious freedom were solved by the 
colonial rule. After independence, however, religious freedom became 
a serious problem, mainly because it is immediately related to the 
constitution, civil liberty, and human rights. Almost all majority 
Muslim countries experienced uneasy debates around the role and the 
status of religion in the state. There were often two groups of them: 
those who supported the idea that Islam should play a greater role in 
the state and those who rejected it. Issues of religious freedom that 
                                                 
15 “Aa Gym Mengaku Nikahi Janda Beranak Tiga,” Kompas, 2 December 2006; “Isu 
Nikahi Janda: Aa Gym Langsung Gelar Jumpa Pers,” Kompas, 2 December 2006. 
16 “Pengajian Aa Gym Mulai Sepi,” Kompas, 8 December 2006. 
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emerged in the post-colonial Muslim countries often generated from 
this early problem of state formation. 
Theoretically speaking, Islam has two different views of religious 
freedom that can be diametrically opposite one to another. The first 
view says that Islam does not comply with many issues of religious 
freedom. Islam cannot tolerate the idea of religious conversion from 
Islam to other religions. It is simply considered apostate (riddah) whose 
sanction is no less than death penalty. According to this view, Islam is 
a superior religion that cannot be superseded by other religions (ya’lu> 
wa la> yu’la> ‘alayh). Consequently, any problems that happen in society 
must be solved in Islamic ways. On the other hand, the second view 
believes that Islam is totally a tolerant and progressive religion, which 
does not force people to embrace their faith. It argues that the very 
scripture of Islam, the Qur’a>n, starkly says that “let there be no 
compulsion in religion” (Q.S. 2:256) and “for you is your religion and 
for me is mine” (Q.S. 109:6). Therefore, Islam is compatible with 
religious freedom. 
The problem is certainly not in theory, but in practice. Since 
independence, religious freedom became a crucial problem of many 
Muslim countries, from Egypt to Indonesia, from yesteryear till today. 
Cases of religious freedom generally took place in the form of 
persecution of the majority against the minority, either Muslims against 
adherents of other religions or the followers of mainstream Sunni 
against the followers of minority groups such as Shi’ism, Baha’ism, and 
Ahmadiyah. In Egypt, the Christians often became the target of 
discrimination. In late 1999, 21 Christians in al-Kosheh were brutally 
murdered by Muslim extremists. Despite assurance from the 
government, there was no trial of this case.17 In April 2006, three 
churches in Alexandria were attacked by a Muslim, resulting in the 
death of one Christian and the wounding of a dozen others. Several 
days later, 59 Muslims were arrested for setting fire to Christian homes. 
There have been no prosecutions yet in these cases. In early 2001, 18 
Egyptian Baha’is were arrested by the police on suspicion of insulting 
religion. Although Baha’ism is not a sect of Islam, religious authorities 
in Egypt keep suspecting that its followers are striving to debilitate 
Islam. 
                                                 
17 The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Pakistan.” See also 2007 report. 
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In Pakistan, cases of religious freedom mostly befell on Islamic 
minority groups, particularly Ahmadiyah. Majority of Pakistanis are 
Sunni Muslims (77%). Minorities comprise of the Shi’ites (19%), 
Hindus (1.5%), Christians (1%), and Ahmadis (0.2%). There are some 
cases that befell on the Shi’ites, the Christians, as well as the Hindus. 
They are however very small compared to what the Ahmadiyah 
members have suffered. Ahmadiyah is a sect of Islam founded by 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908), an Indian Muslim reformer, in 1889. 
The central teaching of Ahmadiyah is a belief that Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad is a prophet. This belief is against the doctrine of the Sunni 
majority that believes in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Pakistan’s constitution requires that laws be consistent with Islam, i.e. 
with the Sunni majority, which considers Ahmadiyah as a deviant sect. 
Persecutions against Ahmadiyah resulted from this blemish 
constitution. Between 1984 to 1999, there were 45 Ahmadi members 
killed, 81 injured, 19 bodies were exhumed after burial in the cemetery, 
31 were denied for burial, 66 Ahmadi mosques were demolished or set 
on fire.18 
In Indonesia, Ahmadiyah also becomes the target of discrimination 
by the Muslim majority. Although Ahmadiyah members have existed 
in the country since quite long times (early 1920s), majority Sunni 
Muslims hardly accept the group. The membership of Ahmadiyah is 
not many. According to J.H. Lamardi, a leader of Ahmadiyah in 
Jakarta, the number of Ahmadis does not exceed half a million 
members.19 Like majority Muslims in Pakistan, the attitude of 
Indonesian Muslims towards Ahmadiyah members is hostile or at best 
intolerant. The highest authority of Indonesian Islam, the Indonesian 
Council of Ulama (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia), has issued two 
fatwas on Ahmadiyah, where it condemns the sect to be “a deviant and 
deviating” (sesat dan menyesatkan). This fatwa greatly contributed to the 
violence against Ahmadiyah members. In late 2006, the Indonesian 
Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), issued an investigative 
report disclosing the role of the MUI’s fatwas in shaping intolerant and 
                                                 
18 The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Indonesia.” See also 2007 report. 
19 Interview with J.H. Lamardi, 21 May 2007. 
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violent attitudes of Indonesian Muslims against Ahmadiyah 
members.20 
In Malaysia, cases of religious freedom took place mostly on the 
non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Hindus and the Christians. 
Islam is the majority religion in Malaysia (61%), although other 
religions comprise a great number of followers. Buddhism has 19% of 
followers, Christianity 9%, and Hinduism 7%. Since the last five years, 
religious freedom in Malaysia is increasingly getting worse. Ironically, 
this happened along with the government’s campaign of “Civil Islam” 
(Islam Hadhari), which is supposed to maintain tolerance and religious 
harmony. In March 2007, R. Subashini, a Hindu woman whose 
husband converted to Islam, failed to get a divorce from the Civil 
Court and was forced to proceed to the Sharia Court, a decision that 
was against Malaysian Constitution, which clearly states that non-
Muslims should be proceeded in Federal Court. In April, an Islamic 
authority raided the house of a Hindu man and his Muslim wife. It 
forced them to separate and took their 3-year-old daughter to prevent 
her from being converted to Hinduism.21 Christians, have also suffered 
from religious discrimination. The most widely-covered example is the 
case of Lina Joy, a Muslim woman converted to Christianity. Her case 
arouses a big shock in the country as she was threatened by apostasy 
charge. According to Muslim belief, an apostate is charged with death 
penalty. 
Religious freedom is a crucial problem in the contemporary 
Muslim societies. Many problems aroused not from the Qur’anic 
doctrines as the scripture is quite clear on the issue, as I stated earlier. 
The problem comes from interpretations made by religious scholars 
(`ulama>’) either on particular ambiguous verses in the Qur’a>n or on the 
tradition of the Prophets (sunnah). The problem even becomes worst 
when such interpretations were adopted by the state or religious 
authority backed by the state. There is no short cut to remedy this 
problem. Tireless campaign and constant promotion of Islam and 
pluralism are the only option that is apparently viable now. In 
Indonesia, campaign and promotion of pluralist and tolerant values of 
                                                 
20 The National Commission of the Indonesian Human Rights (Komnas-HAM), 
“Ringkasan Eksekutif Pemantauan Kasus Ahmadiyah” (Jakarta, September 2006). 
21 The Beureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom Report 2007: Malaysia.” 
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Islam have been undertaken by progressive groups such as the 
International Centre of Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), the Wahid 
Institute, the International Conference of Religion and Peace (ICRP), 
and the Liberal Islam Network (JIL). ICIP, an organization led by a 
liberal Muslim scholar, M. Syafii Anwar, has a special project 
promoting Islam and pluralism in pesantrens in Indonesia. The Wahid 
Institute and JIL, on the other hand, have been in the front line in the 
battle against persecution and discrimination of the majority against 
the minority groups in the country.  
Freedom of Expression 
Like the issue of religious freedom, freedom of expression is 
relatively a new item in Islamic discourse. It is part of the bigger issue, 
namely civil liberties, which include freedom of association, freedom 
of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech. Freedom of 
expression is a broader term for freedom of speech. In one sense, 
freedom of expression also includes the freedom of association and 
assembly since the ultimate target of forming an association is to 
express interests (be it political, economical, cultural, or any other 
interests) through congregation. Freedom of expression is entirely a 
Western discourse. There is no such an issue in the classical Islamic 
thought. Muslim philosophers and theologians discussed freedom in 
the context of god-human relationship and not human-human 
relationship. Thus, the discourse that was developed was around 
freewill and predeterminism. The idea that human being is free to 
express his or her opinion was totally out of question. 
There are however circumstances that we may consider them as 
“cases of freedom of expression.” The book burnings, the killing of an 
author, the torturing of a believer, are examples of the case of freedom 
of expression in the classical times. In 827 AD, al-Ma’mu>n, the seventh 
`Abbasid Caliph who believed in the Mu’tazilite doctrine, founded an 
institution of inquisition to question any Muslims who did not believe 
in the createdness of the Qur’a>n, a belief that was adopted by the 
Mu’tazilism. Some Muslims were afraid to face the torture from al-
Ma’mu >n, and some other dare to express their objection. Those who 
dare to express their opinion would face torture and severe sanction. 
Many cases of freedom of expression befell on politicians, 
philosophers, Sufis, and authors. Great Sufis such as al-H{alla>j and 
Shiha >b al-Di >n al-Suhra>wardi > were executed for their unorthodox 
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views; Ibn Rushd was exiled and his books were burnt. The cases of 
different expressions ―i.e. beliefs and opinions that were expressed 
differently from the one maintained by the status quo― were carried 
on either by the rulers or by religious authorities, or most of the time 
by both. There was absolutely no question why a person should be 
charged for what he or she believed. 
With the absence of the discourse of freedom of expression in the 
classical Islamic thought, it is generally understandable if Muslim 
communities in the modern times find a great difficulty in dealing with 
the issues. There are many classical doctrines of Islam that are starkly 
incompatible with the modern spirit of freedom of expression. Take 
for example the doctrine of blasphemy, which can be applied to 
various actions, from visualizing the prophet, insulting the Qur’a >n, or 
derogating Islamic teachings. The charge of blasphemy can also be 
applied to any Muslims who try to make a new understanding of Islam, 
in spite of the fact that they have a strong basis in Islamic theology. 
This often befalls on Muslim intellectuals who want to reform Islamic 
doctrines. In Egypt cases of blasphemy have become a common issue 
that befalls on authors and Muslim reformists. In 1995, Nas}r H{a>mid 
Abu > Zayd, a prolific Muslim scholar, was brought to court for his 
book on the Qur’a >n. After some trials, he was declared heretic (murtad) 
and was forced to divorce his wife, as he was no longer considered as a 
Muslim. In 2001, Nawa>l Sa’dawi>, a renowned novelist and a Muslim 
feminist, was brought to court for her statement about Islam in an 
interview in an Egyptian newspaper. She was forced, again, to end her 
37-year-old marriage on the accusation that she is no longer a Muslim.  
In Indonesia, cases of freedom of expression emerged in the 
public debate since 1950s. Among the most widely covered case was 
the publication of a short story written by Ki Panjikusmin, an 
anonymous writer, in August 1968. The novel, titled Langit Makin 
Mendung (The Darkening Sky), was protested by many Muslim leaders 
and was accused to have insulted God, Islam, and the Prophet 
Muh}ammad. The case was then brought to the court and the chief 
editor of the magazine that published the story, Hans Begue Jassin 
(himself was a great author), was sentenced to jail.22 In April 1991, 
                                                 
22 Nanang Tahqiq, “Freedom of Speech and Literary Expression: A Case Study of 
‘Langit Makin Mendung’ by Ki Pandjikusmin” (Unpublished MA Thesis, McGill 
University, Canada, 1995). 
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Arswendo Atmowiloto, a young newspaper editor, was sentenced to 
five years in jail, for a charging of insulting Islam. What Atmowiloto 
did was actually just doing polling of leaders admired by his tabloid’s 
readers. His “mistake” is to publish the result that in the polling the 
name of Prophet Muh }ammad was placed in the 11th. Indonesian 
Muslims considered it as blasphemous. The last case concerning the 
problem of Islam and freedom of expression took place in late 2002, 
when Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a young Muslim writer, was condemned to 
death by a group of Muslim cleric in Bandung, West Java. Abshar-
Abdalla was accused to have insulted Islam in his article published in 
Kompas on 18 November that year. The article entitled “Freshening up 
the Islamic Understanding” was actually a short message for Muslims 
to rethink some of Islamic doctrines, which according to him have 
been obsolete. Abshar-Abdalla’s case was never brought to court but 
his life was put in danger, as there were some attempts for Muslim 
radicals to murder him.  
The most popular and high-profile case of Islam and of the 
freedom of expression is certainly that of Salman Rushdie, the British 
author of Indian origin. In February 1989, Ayatullah Khomeini, the 
leader of Islamic revolution in Iran, proclaimed a fatwa requiring 
Rushdie’s death. Khomeini considered Rushdie’s novel, the Satanic 
Verses, as against Islam and the Prophet Muh}ammad. The fatwa 
immediately aroused a fiery reaction by Muslims all over the world. In 
Berkeley, several bookstores selling Rushdie’s book were firebombed. 
In Bombay, 5 people died in a protest at the British Embassy. Several 
other people died in various Muslim countries in rallies at the British 
and American Embassy. In 1991, Rushdie's Japanese translator, 
Hitoshi Igarishi, was killed in Tokyo, and his Italian translator was 
stabbed in Milan. Rushdie’s affair was perhaps the hottest case of 
Islam and freedom of expression in the modern history.23 Muslims 
seemed to have never forgiven Rushdie as eighteenth years later, a 
series of rally against Rushdie were orchestrated in some Muslim 
countries. This time was a protest against an award of knighthood 
given to the author. The protest took place only a year after the 
                                                 
23 Dan Cohn-Sherbok, The Salman Rushdie Controversy in Interreligious Perspective (Lewiston: 
E. Mellen Press, 1990); M. M. Ahsan and A. R. Kidwai, Sacrilege Versus Civility: Muslim 
Perspectives on the Satanic Verses Affair (Markfield, Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 
1991). 
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Muslims’ rage to another controversial publication, i.e. the Danish 
Cartoon. 
Apparently, there is nothing much that the Muslim reformists can 
do with regards to the issue of Islam and freedom of expression. 
Unless there is a radical approach in reformulating the doctrine of 
blasphemy that the Muslims can fully comply with the concept of 
freedom of expression. Unfortunately, majority of Muslims choose to 
maintain the old doctrine than to consider the positive values of 
freedom of expression. There are some Muslim countries like Turkey 
and Indonesia that do not recognize the law of blasphemy. However, 
the problem does not so much lie in the constitutional or legal texts, 
but rather in the mind and mentality of the Muslim majority. The 
charge of blasphemy is often started from the conservative Muslim 
clerics, who spread their ideas into lay Muslims. The government 
usually prefers to be silent witnessing a huge wave of Muslim protests 
demanding for blasphemy law. Thus, like in the case of religious 
freedom, the remedy has no short cut. It needs a persistent and long 
campaign to the Muslims that Islam is compatible with the freedom of 
expression. In turn, this requires a radical reinterpretation of some of 
the classical Islamic doctrines regarding the Prophet, the Qur’a>n and 
other intolerant teachings. 
Conclusion 
Islamic reform movement is a long and a risky task that the 
Muslim intellectuals have been striving for since the last two centuries. 
Starting from the Middle East, the movement spread all over the 
Muslim world. Since the beginning, the character of Islamic reform 
movement is liberal in the sense that it promotes progressive and 
enlightening ideas. In the early periods, the main agenda of Islamic 
reform movement was to question reasons that caused Muslims 
lagging behind and how to free themselves from the shackles of 
Western colonialism. In the latter periods, issues such as democracy, 
freedom, and pluralism, became predominant among Muslim scholars. 
There are four main agendas that the Muslim reformists have been 
trying to deal with, namely, the issue of Islamic polity, the issue of 
women’s rights, religious freedom, and freedom of expression. As I 
have succinctly elaborated, Muslim reformists have gained some 
progress and some regress in dealing with those four issues. [] 
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